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Why Accommodate?
Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars
Maggie Gallagher∗
If gay marriage is a constitutional right, a moral good, a basic norm of
democratic equality, then why accommodate opposing views?
Why should anyone who believes in gay marriage also support conscience
protections for individuals or organizations opposed to gay marriage?
¶1

¶2

The questions posed above are foundational; the answers to each dictate (in
practice) the policy options one is willing to consider in regard to gay marriage,
particularly in terms of accommodations. Technical difficulties of legal drafting aside,
the reasons underlying one’s willingness to consider religious accommodations in the
area of gay marriage will dictate the breadth and kind of religious liberty legislation we
will be willing to consider. Carefully exploring the core question—Why
accommodate?—will enable us to conceptualize why accommodation on this issue is so
difficult, and, particularly, why it is so conceptually difficult for gay marriage advocates
to tolerate the idea of substantial religious accommodations.
This Article proposes four potential reasons why citizens, legislators, and/or judges
who endorse gay marriage should consider accommodating the views of traditional faith
communities: practical, civic, moral sympathy, and principle. I argue (perhaps counterintuitively) that the most urgent need, if we are to reduce the conflict between gay rights
and religious liberty, is not merely to argue from principle alone, but also to develop
respect for the other reasons for accommodation: practical, civic, and moral sympathy.
I. WHY ACCOMMODATE? FOUR REASONS

¶3

Below is a typology of four reasons why gay marriage advocates should support
religious liberty accommodations for those opposed to gay marriage.
A. Practical

¶4

This is the simplest reason for accommodation to secure political support for gay
marriage. To enact gay marriage laws, proponents of gay marriage believe they have to
allay concerns of voters they disagree with by providing religious liberty
accommodations. The narrowness of religious liberty exemptions typically offered by
gay marriage advocates strongly suggests that, at present, allaying voter concerns, not
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creating robust accommodations, is the primary motivation for inclusion of such
exemptions in gay marriage legislation.1
B. Civic
¶5

Large moral conflicts are hard on the fabric of society, especially church-state
conflicts. Tolerance is not just a matter of legal rights but also of civic culture (defined as
the ways we relate to one another in the absence of legal compulsion). When large blocs
in the population disagree on basic moral issues, we as a society look for ways to reduce
the tangible expression of these conflicts in order to promote the common good.
President Bill Clinton’s rule of “maximum feasible accommodation” of religion in the
1990s was one public expression of this view.2
C. Moral Sympathy

¶6

¶7

If gay marriage is, as David Blankenhorn has written, a “conflict of goods,”3 then
even those who judge the balance to be in favor of gay marriage might wish to express
respect for the views of those with whom they disagree. (Just as even strong marriage
advocates like Blankenhorn may be motivated to seek alternative ways to accommodate
gay couples’ needs.4)
Even in the midst of strong moral disagreement, people can often see and
acknowledge some value in the position they oppose. Consider the thorny issue of
abortion. Some abortion-rights advocates can respect a consistent pro-life position.5
Though they believe women have the legal right to terminate a pregnancy, they do not
1
A number of statutory exemptions cover only situations already protected by law, specifically, the
extremely slight possibility that clergy will be forced to officiate in weddings of which their denomination
disapproves. For instance, Vermont’s same-sex marriage law provides that it “does not require a member
of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage . . . to solemnize any marriage, and any refusal to do so
shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5144(b) (2009); see also
Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. CODE § 46-406 (2009); B.
A07732 § 4, 2009–2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009). Other exemptions merely restate existing
constitutional guarantees. For instance, Maine’s same-sex marriage law, recently repealed by referendum
in a people’s veto, expressly “does not authorize any court or other state or local governmental body, entity,
agency or commission to compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution’s religious
doctrine, policy, teaching, or solemnization of marriage within that particular religious faith’s tradition as
guaranteed by the Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 or the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.” An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650 (repealed 2009).
2
This view was first articulated by William A. Galston, a domestic policy advisor to President Clinton, and
now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL
PLURALISM 167 (2005); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES AND DIVERSITY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 295 (1991). Briefly, this view suggests that the state should allow as much
accommodation of religious belief and practice as possible, bounded only by the need for basic social
cohesion.
3
DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 171 (2007).
4
See David Blankenhorn & Jonathan Rauch, A Reconciliation on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2009, at WK11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/opinion/22rauch.html (calling for legal
recognition of civil unions).
5
See Emily Heroy, Dear Pro-Life Movement: I Respect Your Opinion. Can You Respect Mine? From
Someone Who Believes in Pro-Choice (Jan. 22, 2010), http://genderacrossborders.com/2010/01/22/dearpro-life-movement-i-respect-your-opinion-can-you-respect-mine-from-someone-who-believes-in-prochoice/.
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want to live in a society that really sees abortion as morally inconsequential, like clipping
off a fingernail or taking out an appendix.6 These abortion rights advocates may believe
that strong pro-life advocates should be given legal protections and accommodations,7
because they provide a counterbalance to treating abortion as morally insignificant.8
Pacifism is another example of a moral position with which most people do not
agree, but which can nonetheless generate substantial respect that leads to a desire for
conscience protections. By adopting the strongest and most consistent view—that killing
is always wrong—pacifists do a moral service to the rest of us, forcing us to justify our
own views and reminding us of the gravity of the act of killing (whether the soldier in
war, or the murderer at home) even when we disagree with pacifism.9
D. Principle

¶9

By principle, I mean the belief that advocates of traditional marriage have a right to
their views and lifestyles, which the law is obligated to respect. In general, there are
three overlapping but conceptually distinct ways of conceptualizing the principle being
protected: respect for religion as a right, respect for liberty generally as a right,10 and
respect for conscience per se. The difference, then, between the first three reasons for
religious accommodations described above and this final reason of principle, is that
principle obligates. The first three reasons to accommodate are in some sense optional—
they depend on charity and prudence, not duty; they are gifts, not rights. Most people in
favor of some value prefer obligation to choice.
¶10
To further distinguish myself from a legal scholar in this Article, I would like to
make the case that the most urgent need in allaying conflicts between gay marriage and
religious liberty is to develop arguments for accommodation stressing these center two
categories: the civic argument and moral sympathy. The key problem we now face
sociologically, politically, and intellectually lies in the relative paucity in the
development of these kinds of arguments.

6

Cf. Naomi Wolf, Our Bodies, Our Souls, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 1995, at 26 (“I still maintain that
we need to contextualize the fight to defend abortion rights within a moral framework that admits that the
death of a fetus is a real death; that there are degrees of culpability, judgment and responsibility involved in
the decision to abort a pregnancy.”).
7
This includes laws allowing medical professionals not to participate in abortions where doing so would
violate their beliefs or laws preventing public funding of abortion so that taxpayers do not have to subsidize
a procedure they find abhorrent. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c) (2010) (prohibiting certain federally-funded
organizations from discriminating against health care professionals who refuse for religious or moral
reasons to participate in abortions); GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER
MEDICAID (2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf.
8
See Wolf, supra note 6.
9
See Jeff McMahan, The Pacifist Challenge 7 (May 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/2nd_annual_online_philoso/files/jeff_mcmahan.pdf) (“I also
now accept that a certain version of pacifism has much to be said for it and poses a formidable challenge to
those of us who believe in the possibility of just wars.”).
10
As Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter expressed in the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey
decision, liberty itself, apart from any free exercise analysis, is broadly understood to protect one’s concept
of meaning and existence. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Id.
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II. WHY IS ACCOMMODATION DIFFICULT?

¶11

¶12

¶13

¶14

¶15

¶16

¶17

Returning to the introductory question—why accommodate?—helps to explain the
difficulty of creating accommodations for the competing positions on this issue,
particularly for gay marriage advocates to tolerate the idea of substantial religious
accommodations.
Technically, of course, gay marriage does not raise religious liberty issues, but
instead is best understood as a church-state conflict. There is no genuinely “neutral”
position for the state with regard to marriage. As long as marriage retains a legal status,
the law must have some core conception of what marriage is; it cannot leave the
definition to individuals or other groups.
Given this reality—that marriage laws will include some and exclude other at least
potentially competing visions of marriage—technical and academic legal prowess alone
cannot help us name, much less answer, the primary question to drafting accommodation
legislation for people and faith communities that do not see same-sex unions as
marriages: why should we accommodate religious views at all?
Gay marriage advocates have crafted a public argument that presumes there is no
possible good reason to oppose gay marriage. According to some gay marriage
advocates, only animus and hatred explains why, after an appropriate time to get used to
the idea, any American would seriously object to gay marriage.11 But we do not draft
legislative accommodations for irrational hatred.
Before I continue this line of thought, let me start by stating the obvious: I am not a
legal scholar, and in this Article I am not going to play one. The intellectual contribution
that I hope to make to this debate is not that of a detached observer whose expertise is in
legal codes, but as an active participant in the gay marriage civil discourse (and from the
side perhaps least well-represented among law professors, those who oppose gay
marriage).
Yet, let me admit something else: on the question of gay rights, I was for many
years not a participant on any side. I was a watchful bystander. Like many Americans, I
was ambivalent, moved by compassion and civility, held back by a certain apprehension
about where a social change this rapid was headed. For better or for worse, I simply did
not involve myself in the epic battles around gay rights that unfolded around me, on one
side or the other.
However, I began to watch these battles more closely. Marriage, sex, and the
family were my principal concerns, and thus I remember the public arguments, especially
the sound bites most often repeated in the press.12 I remember the public arguments that
kept me a bystander, sympathetic, silent, and yet also nervous.

11

See, e.g., Michael B. Farrell, Prop 8 Trial: Did Animosity Drive California’s Gay Marriage Ban,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0113/Prop.-8-trialDid-animosity-drive-California-s-gay-marriage-ban (reporting attorney Ted Olson’s argument that
“Proposition 8, and the irrational pattern of California’s regulation of marriage which it promulgates,
advances no legitimate state interest. All it does is label gay and lesbian persons as different, inferior,
unequal, and disfavored.”).
12
See Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Defects in the “Defense of
Marriage” Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 221 (1996) (promoting the idea that marriage is bigotry); Mark
Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 981 (1991) (promoting a racial analogy).
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The arguments for gay rights generally were (before the gay marriage debate), I
suspect, rather deliberately framed in ways that kept me, and people like me, a bystander.
Even as the debate began to shift toward same-sex marriage, the presentation of these
arguments was clearly designed to minimize the scope of the changes being
institutionalized in law, partially or wholly to forestall public opposition.13
Incrementalism was the watchword of the day.14
¶19
I remember these arguments because I remember the way in which they
successfully kept me on the sidelines, out of this culture war, until marriage became the
defining issue.
¶20
From my limited perch, I see certain truths about the way in which gay rights and
gay marriage and religious liberties are likely to conflict. And I can perhaps attempt also
to explain the intensity of the current fears around the conflict experienced by supporters
of marriage traditions, especially religious people and communities. I offer these not in
the spirit of a complaint, but in the spirit of genuine dialogue, which begins by trying to
make the way the world looks visible across diverging intellectual, political, and moral
lines.
¶21
Here’s the first insight I can offer: gay marriage advocates and sympathetic cultural
elites feel more confident that the new line between gay rights and the rights of dissenters
(between competing visions of equality and freedom) will be drawn in a reasonable place,
because they feel in charge of drawing the line.15 Traditional religious believers do not,

13

See Andrew Sullivan, Why the M Word Matters to Me, TIME, Feb. 8, 2004,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040216-588877,00.html (linking gay marriage to
personal feelings about acceptance by society); Carol Ness, Straights Join Movement for Gay Marriage,
S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 12, 1999, http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/e/a/1999/02/12/NEWS7171.dtl (arguing that the marriage debate is about the value of gay
persons); Evan Wolfson, Exclusion from Marriage: Historical Parallels (Dec. 1999),
http://www.buddybuddy.com/wolfso02.html (arguing that opposition to redefining marriage is analogous to
opposing interracial marriage).
14
Incrementalism has been a tactical decision of many prominent gay marriage activists, recommended as a
means of minimizing opposition and backlash. See DANIEL CERE, INST. FOR AMERICAN. VALUES, THE
FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 11–12 (2005), available at
http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/future_of_family_law.pdf (“Make no mistake: incremental changes do
not mean unimportant changes. William Eskridge explains the tactical advantages of advocating only
incremental changes to the law. Though he supports same-sex marriage, for strategic reasons, he advises
against any direct push for legal redefinition of marriage. He writes that a main benefit of incrementalism
is that it leaves resulting changes largely immune from direct public criticism and debate.”); see also
THOMAS M. MESSNER, HERITAGE FOUND., ENDA AND THE PATH TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2009),
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/religion/bg2317.cfm# (compiling additional statements of
same-sex marriage supporters advocating an incremental approach to the issue); Kees Waaldijk, Small
Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437 (Robert
Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001) (advocating “the law of small change” as a strategy to same-sex
marriage); Evan Wolfson, Marriage and Gays: What Would Lincoln Do?, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 11,
2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-wolfson/marriage-and-gays-what-wo_b_165761.html
(suggesting the Lincolnian approach would couple moral clarity with incremental action); E.J. Graff,
California Leads on Civil Unions, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 2003, at A11 (“Legislatures in Connecticut
and Rhode Island have, for the past few years, been considering something similar to the California
approach. Same-sex marriage activists there, take note: Much can be accomplished incrementally, as
legislators and citizens see that fairness won’t bring on locusts, boils, plague, et al.”).
15
This is not to say that they are necessarily in charge of drawing the lines on the definition of marriage,
only that they are in charge of drawing the lines between what they will consider bigotry or homophobia
and reasonable disagreement.
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because they are not in charge of the line and the line keeps shifting with head-spinning
rapidity.
¶22
When I was a young adult, in the late 1980s, compassion for AIDS victims was top
priority,16 and a capacity to separate orientation from behavior was the line between good
citizenship and bigotry. Being gay was not a choice. Therefore being gay could not be
the ground for moral condemnation. A “good” Catholic could be gay, provided he
accepted the teachings of his or her church in regards to sexual practice.17 Therefore
sexual orientation per se could not reasonably be used to judge a person, but sexual
behavior (a voluntary act) was still subject to moral critique.
¶23
At this time, not long ago, Cardinal O’Connor of New York could be deemed a
hero for washing the feet of AIDS victims and expanding Church services to help fill this
need.18 Additionally, when the Catholic Church’s catechism condemned “unjust
16

As the Administrative Board of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops wrote at the time:
[W]e are alarmed by the increase of negative attitudes as well as acts of violence directed against
gay and lesbian people since AIDS has become a national issue. We strongly condemn such
violence. Those who are gay or lesbian or suffering from AIDS should not be the objects of
discrimination, injustice, or violence. All of God's sons and daughters, all members of our
society, are entitled to the recognition of their full human dignity.
U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE ADMIN. BD., PUBL’N NO. 195.4, THE MANY FACES OF AIDS: A GOSPEL
RESPONSE (Nov. 14, 1987), available at http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/mfa87.shtml.
17
Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (Oct. 1, 1986),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19861001_homose
xual-persons_en.html (“The intrinsic dignity of each person must always be respected in word, in action
and in law. . . . It has been argued that the homosexual orientation in certain cases is not the result of
deliberate choice; and so the homosexual person would then have no choice but to behave in a homosexual
fashion. Lacking freedom, such a person, even if engaged in homosexual activity, would not be culpable
. . . . What is at all costs to be avoided is the unfounded and demeaning assumption that the sexual
behavior of homosexual persons is always and totally compulsive and therefore inculpable. What is
essential is that the fundamental liberty which characterizes the human person and gives him his dignity be
recognized as belonging to the homosexual person as well.”).
18
See Felicia R. Lee, At a Catholic Health Center, a Haven for AIDS Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1989,
at B1:
“The biggest priority is dealing with AIDS in the diocese” [sic] said Msgr. James T. Cassidy,
the director of health and hospitals for the archdiocese. . . .
The monsignor said he saw no contradiction between the church's commitment to AIDS
patients and its opposition to homosexuality. Many victims of AIDS are homosexual men, and
anal intercourse and intravenous drug use are two common ways the virus is transmitted.
“I think what we're saying is we're not interested in what a person's problem is, but their
sickness,” he said. “We are against homosexual acts, but God says love the sinner, hate the sin.
We felt the need was there.” . . . The unit receives 10 applications for every one of its 44 beds,
which are to be increased to 58 beds in October. A team of medical personnel and social
workers from the hospital goes to every hospital in the city, interviewing patients who fit the
medical and social criteria for admission.
Eight women and 36 men are now living in the AIDS unit. About 35 of them were
intravenous drug users, and many are without friends, family or a home. Since the unit opened,
13 patients have died, but two were released to nursing homes after their symptoms were
alleviated.
Almost all the patients are very thin, some to the point of emaciation. One man is blind, and
several use wheelchairs. Most have some degree of mental impairment.
The patients receive intensive medical care, which can include blood transfusions and a
myriad of daily drugs and procedures. And they say they are grateful for the dignity they are
given. “They Treat You Well” [sic]
“It's mainly what the hospital stirs up inside me,” said Murray, who is 48 and used heroin
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discrimination” against homosexuals—even as it reaffirmed the Church’s traditional
teaching that sex is appropriate only in a marital union of husband and wife—it received
mainstream plaudits.19
The distinction between orientation and behavior, held to be a key distinction only
a few years ago, has now collapsed, rejected by gay rights advocates. The
status/behavior distinction is no longer operative today. If it is okay to be gay, then it
must also be okay to have gay sex. As Chai Feldblum, one of the more generous
theorists of gay rights points out, “What do they think being gay means?”20
Even five years ago, to give another example of rapidly shifting lines, support for
civil unions immunized a believer or moralist from the charge of bigotry or hatred against
gay people:21 While those who opposed all gay legal unions were haters, those who at
least supported civil unions were still viewed by mainstream gay marriage advocates as
within the scope of civility and good citizenship.22
In 2009, with the battle over California’s Proposition 8, a measure that both
overturned gay marriage and yet maintained civil unions, the line between decency and
bigotry was once again abruptly re-drawn. Donors, voters, and advocates who oppose
gay marriage were treated just as much as haters and bigots if they supported civil unions
as if they did not.23
My point is not to critique these shifting positions as right or wrong, but to note this
political, social, and psychological fact: from the standpoint of traditional religious
believers who are opposed to gay marriage, rapidly shifting dividing lines create
immense uncertainty about where the line between decency and discrimination will next
be drawn in the public square.
and cocaine for 25 years. He, like other patients, asked that they be identified only by their first
names. He used to share needles, and he believes that is how he contracted AIDS. “We have a
little bingo on Tuesdays, movies. They treat you well.”
19
Perhaps nowhere was the catechism’s injunction to treat gays and lesbians with dignity, while at the same
time upholding the teachings of the Church regarding sexual ethics, lived out more publicly and
consistently than by John Cardinal O’Connor. While many gay activists decried Cardinal O’Connor’s
consistent opposition to legislation seen as endorsing homosexual conduct, many respected his gracious
care, especially for those suffering from AIDS. See Richard Levine, Koch, in Book with O’Connor, Traces
Conservative Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1989, at A1:
Mr. Koch defends his administration’s decision, over the Cardinal’s objection, to promote the
use of condoms and distribute free needles to drug addicts to help prevent the spread of AIDS.
But the Mayor praises the role of the Catholic Church in treating AIDS patients and disparages
criticism of Cardinal O’Connor by gay rights groups. “John Cardinal O’Connor is a friend, an
invaluable ally for those of us concerned about AIDS,” Mr. Koch writes. “Controversies may
rise between us, but a common bond will always unite us.”
20
Chai Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 104
(2006).
21
Andrew Sullivan, The Right Call, THE DAILY DISH, July 10, 2006,
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2006/07/the_right_call.html (“Fair-minded people can
agree to disagree on support for marriage or civil unions. But denying gay couples any civil protections is
on its face hateful.”).
22
See, e.g., Frank Rich, The Bigots’ Last Hurrah, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at WK 10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/opinion/19Rich.html?_r=1 (lauding Utah governor Jon Huntsman for
supporting civil unions and distinguishing him from “bigots” who oppose same-sex marriage); see also
Stuart Taylor, Gay Marriage by Judicial Decree, NATIONAL JOURNAL, May 24, 2008,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/or_20080524_4694.php.
23
THOMAS M. MESSNER, HERITAGE FOUND., THE PRICE OF PROP 8 (2009), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/bg2328.cfm.
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Those who support gay marriage appear confident and serene about where that line
will be drawn, primarily because they are likely to be in charge of dictating where it will
be drawn: between so-called acceptable ideas and those seen as grounded in irrational
hatred, a.k.a. bigotry.24
To advocates of the traditional understanding of marriage, which includes the vast
majority of America’s major faith traditions and a majority of American voters, recent
experience is far more disturbing, fluid, and uncertain. What has happened already,
which perhaps understandably seems minor to gay marriage advocates, is already deeply
disturbing and unexpected.
For instance, I never expected to live in an America where a state would not permit
a Catholic adoption agency to place children up for adoption unless they were also
willing to place children with same-sex couples,25 or where a city council would vote for
a resolution urging a Catholic bishop and ordinary Catholics to defy their faith as “unAmerican.”26 In the larger scale of human history, one may believe that these are small
things. The sky has not fallen, so to speak. However, there is a large, jagged crack in the
ceiling of our culture that appears to increasingly demand one to choose between one’s
faith and one’s citizenship.
The conflict between religious liberty and state power in Europe and Canada on
this issue is shocking to the American conscience, and yet the sky is not falling there.
Grotesque government intrusions of religious liberty in the name of equality are treated
as normal, and even celebrated as gay rights advances.27
This cultural process of redefining traditional views on sexual morality as
illegitimate bigotry does not only affect how society views gay people, it also affects
what might be called respect the for “the natural family.” In 2003, when I first entered
the marriage debate, I said, “[t]he ideal for a child is a mother and father, and marriage
24

See Shannon Gilreath, Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 ILL. L. REV.
205 (2010); Marci Hamilton, Religious Liberty, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Coming Pressure on
Legislatures to Reach An Appropriate Permissive Accommodation of Religious Entities That Discriminate
Against Gay Couples (Nov. 1, 2007), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20071101.html. For a gay
marriage supporter who is more sympathetic to the liberty concerns of traditional believers, see Eugene
Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (2006), and ANDREW
KOPPELMAN & GEORGE W. DENT, MUST GAY RIGHTS CONFLICT WITH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY? (forthcoming
2010).
25
See Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston, WEEKLY STANDARD, May 15, 2006, at 20; John Garvey, State
Putting Church Out of Adoption Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2006, at A15 (describing the decision
of the state not to accommodate the organization’s desire to continue placing children for adoption but not
placing them with same-sex couples).
26
See Rachel Gordon, Supervisors Slam Vatican on Adoptions, S.F. CHRONICLE, Mar. 22, 2006, at B3.
27
See Heintz v. Christian Horizons, [2008] 2008 H.R.T.O. 22 (Can.), available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onhrt/doc/2008/2008hrto22/2008hrto22.pdf (holding Christian residential
center cannot require employees to comply with moral code); Reaney v. Hereford Diocesan Bd. of Fin.,
No. 1602844/2006 (Employment Trib. of Cardiff July 17, 2007), available at
http://thinkinganglicans.org.uk/uploads/herefordtribunaljudgment.html (holding Anglican Bishop cannot
dismiss youth minister in a same-sex relationship); QUE. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, QUEBEC POLICY AGAINST
HOMOPHOBIA (Dec. 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/english/publications/rapports/pdf/homophobie-a.pdf (setting forth strong
new policy to combat what the government believes to be homophobia, including in non-public settings);
Sarah Lyall, Who is a Jew? Court Ruling in Britain Raises Question, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2009, at A8,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/world/europe/08britain.html (discussing a British ruling
that a Jewish school cannot exclude non-Jews from enrollment); Laurie Goodstein, A Line in the Sand for
Same-Sex Marriage Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2008, at A12 (describing religious liberty conflicts).
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exists to further this ideal.”28 Gay marriage advocates mostly responded that gay
marriage would not change that ideal: “Gay marriage would have no consequences for
you,” I was most often told.29
¶33
Yet by September of 2009, just a few years down this road, I did a Maine radio
interview in which I said, “[m]arriage is not discrimination because unions of husband
and wife really are special. These are the only kind of unions that can make new life and
connect those children in love to their mother and father.” Instantly, the host responded,
“I can’t believe I’m hearing such bigotry!”30
¶34
Indeed, in Maine, though the majority of local voters disagreed, gay marriage
advocates felt confident enough in their position that they went after the social work
license of a high school counselor after she appeared in a TV ad opposing same-sex
marriage.31 Conversely, a teacher who appeared in a pro-gay marriage ad faced no such
threat to her livelihood.32 I never expected to live in an America where individuals could
be threatened with a loss of their livelihood for expressing their position on marriage
laws.
¶35
There exist many other instances of apparent deception (or perhaps, more
charitably, rapid “incrementalism”) by gay marriage advocates. For instance, in 2005,
gay rights advocates succeeded in passing a civil union law in Connecticut,33 publicly
promising it was not about gay marriage.34 But the next day gay marriage advocates
turned around in court and used the existence of a civil union law to persuade the
Connecticut Supreme Court that the state’s marriage laws were discriminatory.35
28

Maggie Gallagher, The Stakes, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, July 14, 2003,
http://article.nationalreview.com/269352/the-stakes/maggie-gallagher.
29
See Steve Chapman, An Odd Silence on Gay Marriage, REASON.COM, Aug. 20, 2009,
http://reason.com/archives/2009/08/20/an-odd-silence-on-gay-marriage.
30
NOM News Digest, http://opine-editorials.blogspot.com/2009/09/nom-news-digest.html (Sept. 2009)
(reporting on an appearance by Maggie Gallagher on The Ken and Mike Morning News Show, 560 WGAN,
on September 4, 2009, available at http://podcast.560wgan.com/wgan/1937751.mp3).
The initial attacks on Carrie Prejean, including the comment by a pageant official that “I am personally
. . . hurt that Miss California believes marriage rights belong only to a man and a woman,” also reflect this
view that opposition to gay marriage itself, however innocently and civilly expressed, is hateful bigotry.
See Carrie Prejean Says Answer to Gay Marriage Question Cost Her Miss USA Crown, FOX NEWS, Apr.
20, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2009/04/20/carrie-prejean-says-answer-gay-marriagequestion-cost-miss-usa-crown/.
Obviously, it is surprising to hear the cross-cultural and, until very recently, almost universally accepted
idea that marriage is the union of a man and a woman (because that type of relationship alone can produce
children without third party intervention) characterized as bigotry. Advocates of so-called “traditional”
marriage do not see bigotry; they see what is, to them, an obvious reflection of a natural reality.
31
See Maine Counselor’s Career Threatened for Support for Marriage (Oct. 30, 2009),
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/story.aspx?cid=5112.
32
Id.
33
An Act Concerning Civil Unions, Conn. Pub. Act No. 05-10 (2005).
34
Connecticut OKs Civil Unions for Gay Couples, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 20, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7579226/.
35
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 416 (Conn. 2008).
Similarly, when gay adoption was institutionalized, advocates in public seldom made an argument for
equality. They did not tell the general public that the reason we should permit gay adoption is because our
ideal of marriage and the natural family was bigoted and discriminatory, or that all family forms are the
same. Indeed, they did not say kids were no better off with a mom and dad than a gay man. Rather, more
typically, they said children were better off with a gay man as a parent, than no parent at all. As Matthew
Coles, Director of the ACLU’s Lesbian and Gay Rights Project and attorney representing the plaintiff’s in
Florida’s gay adoption case, told the New York Times in 2001, “I wouldn’t argue that married parents are
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I am walking through these anecdotes and incidents not to try to set up a contest in
which the comparatively modest legal pressures currently aimed at religious believers are
set against the history of gay people in this country. This Article is not a complaint; it is
an honest attempt to contribute to this discourse by making visible to gay marriage
advocates why so many who oppose gay marriage are convinced that gay marriage is
going to have serious consequences down the road36—for themselves, their families, and
their faith communities, including religious schools, charities, and ministries.
These consequences are not something we see happening in the remote and
uncertain future. They are visibly happening now. We now live in an America in which
to speak (and especially to act) for the idea that “to make a marriage you need a husband
and wife” will in itself provoke charges of hatred, bigotry, and discrimination. The
end—if we do not stand our ground—is not at all clear to us.
Those who publicly note these concerns are not scaremongering. They are scared
by the logical implications of reframing the marriage debate to cast those who believe
marriage requires a man and a woman as hateful bigots whose beliefs must be suppressed
by operation of law.
Why does gay marriage now pose a credible threat to religious liberty in the minds
of opponents? First, marriage represents the “hardest case” for gay rights advocates. If
the idea that there is no difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couplings can be
used to overturn our marriage traditions, then there is clearly no place in American
society where drawing any distinctions can be appropriate. If “children need moms and
dads” is bigotry, any objection to homosexual conduct, or preference for the natural
family, is bigotry.
Moreover, marriage is a public act, so it makes latent conflicts in orientation
discrimination laws manifest. This is what happened in the Massachusetts Catholic
Charities situation, where the local Catholic Church realized its previous “don’t ask,
don’t tell” fudging around the lines would no longer work.37 Publicly married gay
couples would show up and ask for children. The Church would either be forced to place
these children with gay married couples in public opposition to its principles on a
nondiscriminatory basis, or face criminal and civil penalties.38

not in a child’s best interest . . . . But that’s not the choice for these kids. With 3,400 kids in foster care in
Florida waiting for adoption, the choice for these kids is a home with gay people or no real home at all.”
Tamar Lewin, Court Backs Florida Ban on Adoption By Gays, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at A14.
Only once gay adoption was institutionalized by law was it used in court to suggest that the ancient
deeply embedded idea in our legal history that marriage was about bringing together the child’s natural
parents where possible was, well, no longer operative or sustainable. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) (looking to Massachusetts law on same-sex adoption in
concluding that because “the Commonwealth affirmatively facilitates bringing children into a family
regardless of whether . . . the parent or her partner is heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual,” “[r]estricting
marriage to opposite-sex couples . . . cannot plausibly further [the State’s interest in protecting the welfare
of children].”)
36
Some of these consequences are noted throughout this Article, such as incursions on religious liberty and
the endorsement of a message that children do not need a mother and father.
37
See Daniel Avila, Same-Sex Adoption in Massachusetts, the Catholic Church, and the Good of the
Children: The Story Behind the Controversy and the Case for Conscientious Refusals, 27 CHILD. LEGAL
RTS. J. 1 (2007).
38
See Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 939, 975 (2007); Garvey, supra note 25.
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In Washington D.C., the Catholic Church asked the D.C. City Council for religious
liberty protections that would permit Catholic Charities (a highly-regarded adoption and
foster care social service in a locale where, unfortunately, corruption and incompetence
are all too common in the provision of government services39) to continue to help
abandoned and abused children.40 The response of the D.C. City Council was once again
telling: “They don’t represent, in my mind, an indispensable component of our social
services infrastructure.”41
Orientation laws, including gay marriage laws, are posing a new threat to religious
liberty, and liberty of conscience generally, because they are being dramatically
reinterpreted from the time of their original inception to include both an equality right to
be and a liberty right to do, as Chai Feldblum put it.42
This new conception is an equality right on steroids; the right being asserted is not
only to live as one chooses, but to be protected from knowledge of civil and moral
disagreement with the choices one has made in everyday life, in the interests of
advancing equality.
Liberty arguments lead to pluralism, which requires us to tolerate those with whom
we disagree and affirm their core rights. Equality arguments lead to the expansion of
state power to repress and marginalize anti-equality bigots. The fusion of liberty and
equality rights in the gay rights debates represents the biggest intellectual and conceptual
challenge to finding a path to pluralism.
This is a problem for traditional faith communities, but it is also at the heart of the
difficulties gay marriage advocates have had in endorsing religious liberty protections.
In the medium term, overcoming the threat posed to religious liberty will require
not only substantive accommodation but at least some modest conceptual
disentanglement of the equality and the liberty interest implicit in the idea of gay rights.
Traditional religious believers will have to accept that they live among people who
view gay sex (and gay marriage) as a good—and should be required to respect the rights
of those who disagree, including basic norms of civility. But they should not be asked to
endorse that belief themselves as a condition of good citizenship as individuals or in and
through their associations and organizations.
Let me be clear: I am not saying that gay rights include the right to be but not the
right to do. I believe that gay rights are a liberty interest and that they include the right to

39

See Vernon Loeb, Barry Brings Halt to Turbulent D.C. Saga, WASH. POST, May 22, 1998, at A1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/dc/barry/barryyears0522a.htm.
40
Tim Craig, Michelle Boorstein, & Carol Morello, D.C. Council Digs in on Same-Sex Nuptials, WASH.
POST, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR2009111210789.html.
41
Tim Craig & Michelle Boorstein, Catholic Church Gives D.C. Ultimatum, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111116943.html (quoting
Councilmember David Catania).
42
Feldblum, supra note 20, at 104 (“In the legal arena, this approach to a gay person’s identity and being
has been framed as the ‘status/conduct’ distinction. . . . From the moment I became aware of this legal
approach, I have detested it and argued against it. It seemed to me the height of disingenuousness,
absurdity and indeed disrespect, to tell someone it is permissible to ‘be’ gay, but not permissible to engage
in gay sex. What do they think being gay means?”); see also id. at 120 (“Just as we do not tolerate private
racial beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the commercial arena, even if such beliefs are
based on religious views, we should similarly not tolerate private beliefs about sexual orientation and
gender identity that adversely affect LGBT people.”).
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do: the right of gay people to live as they choose, to express affection, to be who they are
in public unmolested by harassment, to visit each other in hospital rooms, etc.
The law in my view must intervene to protect the legitimate liberty interests of gay
people.43 But if gay rights are understood as a liberty interest, rather than an equality
interest, then gay people do not have the right to be protected from the knowledge that
many people have a different way of organizing, understanding, conceptualizing, and
therefore acting upon their sexual impulses, both gay, straight, in between, or something
else.44
I understand that it is quite possible that most people, in the postmodern context,
may well conclude upon reflection that a persistent sexual desire between consenting
adults that hurts no third party is either a moral good, or at least a morally neutral act.
But there are other ways of thinking about, conceptualizing, and enacting the meaning of
human bodies and human desires, of defining the sexual good that ought to be protected
and respected legally and culturally.45
Why? The gap between desire and action is a gap that demands reflection, which
means and includes the possibility of moral critique and moral disagreement. Here is
another way in which sexual liberty and religious liberty share certain common premises.
American civic culture insists on the full citizenship of all religions, but it never
requires the religious believer to surrender his or her truth claims about other religions as
the price of gaining that liberty. If respect for conscience drives our respect for religious
difference, that very respect presumptively includes the right and duty to critique each
other’s consciences, not to be free from painful or upsetting controversy about the nature
of God, the purpose of life, or the content of the moral good.
At the same time, religious liberty has spawned a civic culture and etiquette that
includes recognizing that the time, place, and manner of such critiques should be
restrained and channeled by civic respect for our mutual rights as citizens. This etiquette
is not primarily a matter of law but of the culture of mutual civic respect that religious
liberty has fostered in the public square. We are free to criticize the truth claims of each
other’s religions, but not in a context that calls each other’s rights, liberties, or good
citizenship into question.
I would go further: each one of us (including gay people) has a human right to live
in a society that not only grudgingly permits but encourages moral reflection about sexual
behavior. A sexual desire cannot be its own justification. To take the alternative
“equality” position (that a desire should not be open to critique, because too much of
one’s personhood is at stake) is to dehumanize all of us as nothing more than sexual
beings. To take the position that one was born with sexual desire, cannot control sexual
desire, and therefore must have this desire treated as akin to skin color or gender, is
43

The question of gay marriage, in my view, cannot be settled on that ground, for reasons I will not go into
here, but see Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33 (2004).
44
See David France, The Science of Gaydar, N.Y. MAG., June 17, 2007,
http://nymag.com/news/features/33520/ (describing the variety of understanding of sexuality).
45
See GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS, VOLUME 2: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE ch. 9 (1993);
DAVID GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1990); STANLEY JAMES GRENZ, SEXUAL
ETHICS: AN EVANGELICAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); Catechism of the Catholic Church: The Sacrament of
Matrimony, http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p2s2c3a7.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2010); Southern
Baptist Convention, The Baptist Faith and Message § XVIII, http://www.sbc.net/BFM/bfm2000.asp (last
visited Aug. 9, 2010).
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ultimately dehumanizing, for all people, including gay people. Free adults should not ask
to be protected from the knowledge that rational people disagree about appropriate sexual
behavior, no matter how painful they may find it.
To repeat myself: many, perhaps most, Americans may adopt the view that
unchosen sexual desires (a.k.a., “orientations”) that do not hurt third parties are morally
justified. But that latter additional step—sexual desire is unchosen and therefore sexual
behavior is justified—must still be taken in a way that respects, permits, and encourages
moral reflection about sexual acts. The race analogy conceptually fails in sexual
behavior discussions. Skin color does not give rise to a morality.46 Sexual behavior—
because it is behavior—necessarily does.
And so some others—perhaps few or perhaps many—will remain attached, for
religious and other reasons, to the great enduring principles that animated and
undergirded our civilization for generations. These principles produced, for better and
for worse, not only our law, but our art, our history, and our ethical reflections including
these moral truths (no longer self-evident but still compelling): the bodies of human
beings, male and female, are not mere instruments to be bent to our personal desires and
wills. They have an objective meaning and purpose that is larger than satisfying our
desires and appetites.
Many of us will hold these truths, even when they are no longer self-evident: men
and women are made for each other, and sexual desire is intended by nature as well as by
nature’s God to pull men and women together into families in which the co-creators of
the child will love and care for the child. Sexual desire is morally intended therefore to
pull the sexes into service not only to each other but to the great cause of cooperating in
the creation of life.47
I submit the resistance of the American people to the idea of gay marriage is
grounded, as Stanford Law Professor Richard Thompson Ford wrote in 2006, in an
understanding of gender and its part in the experience of the meaning of our embodiment:
How to reconcile the growing support for equal rights for gay Americans
with the seemingly hardening opposition to gay marriage? It certainly
suggests that homophobia is only part of the explanation for the
widespread resistance to same-sex marriage. A lot of the resistance is less
about sexual orientation than about sex difference. In other words, it’s not
about the difference between gay and straight; it’s about the difference
between male and female. By this logic, conventional marriage doesn’t
exclude gay couples from a special status reserved for straights; it
excludes women from a special status reserved for men—that of
46

No one would argue, for instance, that having a certain color of skin is right or wrong. Many people,
however, believe, and act on the belief, that certain choices are right or wrong. Almost everyone would
agree if the subject were non-consensual sexual relations. Would a discussion of non-consensual skin color
even make sense?
47
For example, “‘God is love and in himself he lives a mystery of personal loving communion. Creating
the human race in his own image, God inscribed in the humanity of man and woman the vocation, and thus
the capacity and responsibility, of love and communion.’ ‘God created man in his own image . . . male and
female he created them;’ He blessed them and said “Be fruitful and multiply.” . . . Physical, moral and
spiritual difference and complementarity are oriented toward the good of marriage and the flourishing of
family life.” CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 560 (2d ed. 2009). See BLANKENHORN, supra note 3,
for a discussion of cross-cultural evidence of the prevalence of similar basic beliefs about marriage.
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husband—and excludes men from a status reserved for women—that of
wife.48
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Even people who do not enter into a conventional marriage, who never produce
children with their acts of love, who may not even have sex, or who are not even attracted
to the opposite sex, may decide, upon reflection, to commit their life to principles of
organizing human sexuality upon other principles than those espoused by gay marriage
advocates. I know this because I have met these people.49 Our philosophy and
jurisprudence must be big enough to include these human possibilities, if we are to do
justice.
A free society cannot be frozen by today. We have to hold out for possibilities yet
undreamt of in our contemporary essentialist philosophizing about orientation. Even if
those of us who believe in the conclusion that gay sex is good or morally neutral, cannot
therefore deny the reality of the process of moral reflection, which includes the necessity
of considering possible critiques.
Here is the strongest form of my argument: disagreement about the nature,
meaning, and purpose of human sexuality cannot be redefined as bigotry without doing a
profound injustice to all our human rights, including to advocates of gay rights.
Understanding gay rights as an equality right collapses this key distinction between
bigotry and good faith disagreement, in a way that will make it easier to use the law to
protect gay people from a daily awareness of the reality that many people in society
morally disapprove of sexual acts between two men or two women.50
Gay people who have concluded that gay sex is good deserve to live in a society
where that decision is respected and understood as the result of a moral reflection, not
policed by government and law as if it were a characteristic over which human beings
have no control.51 Conscience protections to same-sex marriage and orientation
discrimination laws ultimately serve the human rights of all.
But this will happen only if—and this is a great “if”—we can recognize the case for
opposition to gay sexuality and to gay marriage as having roots in something other than
mere hatred. That is our task, however improbable. That is the pathway to an American
solution.

48

Richard Thompson Ford, Hate and Marriage: Same-Sex Marriage Setbacks May Not Be All Bad News
for Gay Rights, SLATE, July 12, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2145620/.
49
See Mark Oppenheimer, A Gay Catholic Voice Against Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010, at
A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/us/05beliefs.html. David Benkof, an openly gay
Orthodox Jew, is another such example. See David Benkof, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Benkof
(last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
50
Lydia Saad, Americans Evenly Divided on Morality of Homosexuality, GALLUP, June 18, 2008,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/Americans-Evenly-Divided-Morality-Homosexuality.aspx.
51
For an example of the latter argument, see Dean Hamer & Michael Rosbash, Genetics and Proposition 8,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/23/opinion/la-oe-rosbash23-2010feb23.
There are also biological explanations of many human choices and characteristics, including religion, as Dr.
Hamer’s work suggests. See DEAN HAMER, THE GOD GENE: HOW FAITH IS HARDWIRED INTO OUR GENES 7
(2004). There is undoubtedly a biological substrata to many sexual inclinations, as well as to other
inclinations, from owning dogs to consuming alcohol. We live in bodies, our bodies influence our minds,
but this isn’t an answer to the need for moral reflection about acts to which we are strongly genetically
predisposed.
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